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Introduction
In this paper information collecting (IC) situations and games (cf. Brânzei The state space and the action space in an information collecting situation can be infinite. We consider possibilities of approximating such an IC-situation with a finite IC-situation where the state space and the action space are finite and we relate the original IC-game with the IC-games of finite approximations. The considered approximations turn out to be good in the sense that the corresponding games are nearby. So continuity properties of relevant solutions for the class of IC-games are interesting. We compare relevant solutions such as the core (Gillies, 1953) , the set of bi-monotonic allocation schemes (Brânzei et al., 2001b ) and marginal-based allocation rules (Tijs et al., 2001) of the approximate game with those of the original game, extending results from Lucchetti et al. (1987) .
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce ICsituations and the corresponding games, look at properties and also at the subclass of IC-games, where a certain concavity condition holds. Section 3 deals with compensation rules and continuity properties of solution concepts which are relevant for the class of IC-games. In Sections 4 and 5 we present procedures for discretizing the state space (going from an infinite state space to a finite one) and for reducing the dimension of the action space, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
Information collecting situations and games
Information collecting situations model cooperative behavior of agents when one of them (the decision-maker) is facing uncertainty due to informational deficiencies when making decisions and the others (the informants) can provide additional information about the state of the nature.
In an information collecting (IC) situation the decision-maker has to decide which action to take in order to maximize his expected reward which depends upon both his choice and the true state of the world not precisely 3 known by the agent. An IC situation C is described by the tuple for all S ∈ 2 N with n ∈ S. Here I S = ∧ i∈S I i is the coarsest partition of Ω that is a refinement of I i for each i ∈ S :
.
Notice that alone agent n can attain the expected payoff
is the σ-algebra of Borel sets of [0, 1] and µ is the Lebesgue measure on
where it is shown that a game is an IC-game with decision-maker n if and only if it is a n-monotonic game in which the decision-maker has veto power,
We denote by MV n the set of such games.
For each coalition S ⊂ N and i ∈ S, the marginal contribution of player i in the game hN, vi is defined by
Interesting are those IC-games with the n-concavity property. An IC-
We denote this subclass of IC-games by MV n C n . It is shown in 
for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N with n ∈ S.
Compensation rules and continuity considerations
If the decision-maker n works together with the agents in N \ {n} to improve his reward, then the question 'How to compensate the informants?' 6 arises. The introduced IC-game opens the possibility to consider compensation schemes which correspond to solution concepts for cooperative games.
In particular, we focus on marginal based allocation rules, where the compensation of each informant is based on the marginal contribution induced by his information to the decision-maker's reward and on bi-monotonic allocation schemes which take the decision-maker's veto power into account.
Both of these compensation solutions are related with the core of an IC-game, which is always non-empty.
Recall that the core of the game hN, vi (Gillies) is defined by
The continuity properties of the core for cooperative games are discussed in Lucchetti et al. (1987) . In that paper and also here the linear space of n-person games is endowed with a metric d defined by
In order to study continuity properties of relevant solution concepts for IC-games, we give some definitions and introduce some useful notations.
Denote by P n the set {S ⊂ N | n ∈ S} of coalitions containing the decisionmaker n.
for all S, T ∈ P n with S ⊂ T and all i ∈ S \ {n}. Here C(S, v) denotes the core of the subgame (S, v).
Example 2 Take the information collecting situation of Example 1. Note that v ∈ MV 3 and that also v is 3-convex. The allocation scheme
is a bi-monotonic allocation scheme corresponding to the τ -value (cf. Tijs, 1981) , where each of the informants 1 and 2 obtains half of his marginal contribution in the subgames to which he belongs.
An imputation x is bi-mas extendable if there is a bi-mas [b S,i ] S∈Pn,i∈S , such that x j = b N,j for all j ∈ N.
We denote by BM N n the set of all games (N, v) which have at least one bi-mas, and where n is a veto-player. 
Let
For every fixed α = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n−1 ) ∈ [0, 1] N\{n} , we define the marginal allocation rule
Theorem 2 For every fixed α, the function Ψ α is (2n − 1)-Lipschitz.
Proof. Let v and w belong to MV n C n :
It is shown (Tijs et al., 2001 ) that any core element of a game v ∈ MV n is a marginal based allocation rule and that the set of marginal based allocation rules for a game v in MV n coincides with the core of the game if and only if v is a big-boss game.
The canonical discretization of an IC-situation
In this section we describe a natural way to discretize the infinite state space
and to arrive at a strategic equivalent IC-situation
where the state space Ω 0 is finite. The idea behind the discretization is simple. Each of the players in the IC-situation C is provided with a finite information partition I i of Ω. The common refinement I N = ∧ i∈N I i is also a finite partition of Ω. Each atom of this common refinement consists of points which are neither distinguishable by agents nor by coalitions who pool their information. So it is natural to replace such an atom by one point and then these points generate Ω 0 . The probability measure, the information partitions and the reward function can then be adjusted, leading to the canonical discretization.
In the following we describe these constituents of C 0 in terms of C. Each atom I(J, K, . . .) in the common refinement I N of I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n is considered as one point of Ω 0 and we denote this point by i (j, k, . . .). Hence, Note that for each of the partitions I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I n (and also for I S = ∧ i∈S I i for each S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}) the atoms are finite unions of elements in I N . So the atoms in I i (i ∈ N) correspond to disjoint subsets of Ω 0 , which form a partition of Ω 0 , that we denote by I 0 i . The reward r 0 (i, a) corresponding to action a ∈ A and state i ∈ Ω 0 is defined by
where I is the atom in I N corresponding to i. So, we have defined the canonical discretization C 0 of C. Note that there is also a one to one relation between the atoms of I S and I 0 S = ∧ i∈S I 0 i . We will denote in the following the atom in I 0 S which corresponds to the atom J in I S by J. The question arises: What is the relation between the corresponding IC-games v 0 and v? The answer is simple.
Theorem 3 The IC-games v 0 and v corresponding to C 0 and C coincide.
Proof. Take S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. We have to show that v 0 (S) = v(S). Using the definition of v 0 (S) and the fact that (Ω 0 , µ 0 ) is a finite measure space we
Now using the definition of µ 0 and r 0 we obtain
Combining (1) and (2) In the next section we go one step further and we will describe a method to find for an IC-situation with a finite state space a related appropriate IC-situation with the same state space and also with a finite action space. 12 5 A reduction procedure for the action space
be an IC-situation with Ω finite. Take ε > 0. The objective is to find an IC-situation
where A(ε) is a finite subset of A, such that the distance of the two corresponding games v and v ε does not exceed ε.
Since Ω is finite, also the family 2 Ω of non-empty subsets of Ω is finite. For each J ∈ 2 Ω we take an action a (ε, J) ∈ A with the property that
Define
Then A(ε) ⊂ A and for the corresponding C ε and its IC-game v ε we have
Proof. Take S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}.Then Then Ω 0 = {p, q, r} and optimal actions corresponding to the subsets {p} , {q} , {r} , {p, q} , {p, r} , {q, r} , and {p, q, r} of Ω 0 are 1 6 , 1 2 , 5 6 , 1 3 , 1 2 , 2 3 and 1 2 , respectively. So the information collecting situation C 00 , obtained from C 0 by replacing A = [0, 1], by A 00 = n 1 6 , 1 3 , 1 2 , 2 3 , 5 6 o is an information collecting situation for which the corresponding game v 00 coincides with v 0 .
Concluding remarks
Combining the procedures in Sections 4 and 5 we can find for each ICsituation C with infinite state and action spaces a related finite approximation C 00 such that the two involved IC-games are as near to each other as one wants. The continuity properties of the different compensation schemes guarantee then that the corresponding compensations in the two games are also near to each other. A similar discretization procedure can be developed for information sharing games, introduced in Slikker et al. (2000) . In this context it is interesting to note that the multifunction PMAS, which assigns to a game the set of its population monotonic allocation schemes (cf. Sprumont, 1990) is upper and lower continuous by the same argument used for the multifunction BIMAS.
